Key Generation over a Cellular Model with a Helper 1

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Abstract

The problem of simultaneously generating a key pair for a cellular source model with a helper is investigated, in which each of four terminals, $X_0$, $X_1$, $X_2$, and $X_3$, observes one component of a vector source. Terminal $X_0$ wishes to generate two secret keys $K_1$ and $K_2$ respectively with terminals $X_1$ and $X_2$ with the help of terminal $X_3$. All terminals are allowed to communicate over a public channel. An eavesdropper is assumed to have access to the public discussion. In symmetric key generation models, model 1a assumes that the two keys are concealed from the eavesdropper, and model 1b further requires that the two keys are concealed from the helper in addition to the eavesdropper. The asymmetric key generation models 2a and 2b are the same as symmetric key generation models 1a and 1b, respectively, except that the key $K_2$ is further required to be concealed from terminal $X_1$. For all models studied, the key capacity region is established by designing a unified achievable strategy to achieve the cut-set outer bounds.

1 Introduction

In Shannon’s secrecy system, it is essential that distinct terminals share a common secret key, which can be exploited to achieve secure communication. In [1–3], it has been shown that such a secret key can be established between two remote terminals if each terminal has access to a component of a vector source sequence and the two terminals can communicate with each other via a public channel which is observable to an eavesdropper. The generated key can be kept secure from the eavesdropper. The key capacity for the two-terminal source model has been established in these studies. Since then, various models of key generation with public discussion have been studied. In [4], the model with two terminals and a helper was studied and the key capacity is characterized when there is no rate constraint on the public discussion. Later, in [5], the problem of secret key generation among multiple (more than two) terminals was studied and the key capacity was established when there is no constraint on the public discussion. In [6], the same problem was revisited, and the scenario with

1The work of H. Zhang and Y. Liang was supported by a National Science Foundation CAREER Award under Grant CCF-10-26565 and by the National Science Foundation under Grant CNS-11-16932. The work of L. Lai was supported by a National Science Foundation CAREER Award under Grant CCF-13-18980 and by the National Science Foundation under Grant CNS-13-21223. The work of S. Shamai was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF), and the European Commission in the framework of the Network of Excellence in Wireless COMmunications NEWCOM#.

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only a subset of terminals being allowed to talk publicly was studied. In [7], an equivalent form of the secret key capacity for multiple terminals was characterized in terms of *mutual dependence*, which can be interpreted as generalization of mutual information for more than two variables.

All the studies described above considered the problem of generation of a single secret key. More recently, there is increasing interest on the problem of simultaneously generating multiple secret keys over source models. The model of generating a secret key and a private key among three terminals was first studied by Ye and Narayan in [8], in which three terminals observe correlated source outputs, and all three terminals wish to agree on a common secret key to be kept secure from an eavesdropper while two designated terminals wish to agree on a private key to be kept secure from both the third terminal and the eavesdropper. In [8], an outer bound on the key capacity region was provided and was shown to be achievable under a certain condition. More recently, in [9,10], it was further shown that the outer bound established in [8] is also achievable for the remaining cases of this model by employing a random binning and joint decoding scheme. Hence, the key capacity region for this model is established in general.

Another so-called cellular source model was recently studied in [11,12], in which one (base station) terminal wishes to generate independent keys respectively with a number of (mobile) terminals. In [11], the key sum capacity is established, and inner and outer bounds on the key capacity region was derived for the special case of two-key generation with an helper. In [12], the key capacity region was established for the two-key generation case with an additional requirement that one key should also be kept secure from the other mobile terminal.

It is clear that so far the multi-key capacity region is characterized only for three terminal systems. It is thus of interest to investigate whether it is possible to characterize the multi-key capacity region for systems with more than three terminals. Such exploration needs to address two challenging issues. (1) Although the key capacity region for the three-terminal model [8,10,12] was shown to be equal to the cut-set bound, it is not clear at the outset whether the cut-set bound can still be achieved for models with different secrecy requirements and for four-terminal models with an additional helper. In general, cut-set bound is less likely achievable as the system gets more complicated. (2) For the three-terminal model, there are three cuts for generating two keys, and schemes can be designed to achieve corner points of the cut-set bound for each case of the source distribution. However, for four-terminal models with a helper, there are six cuts for generating two keys, and these six cuts yield eight possible structures of the cut-set bound. It is not clear whether there exists a unified design of schemes to achieve all cut-set bound structures.

Our contribution in this paper lies in establishing key capacity regions for four source models (see Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4) of generating a pair of keys, and our results provide affirmative answers to both of the above issues. All models address the problem of generating two keys among three terminals with the assistance of a dedicated helper with each terminal observing one component of a correlated vector source. Terminals $X_0$ and $X_1$ wish to generate a key $K_1$, and terminals $X_0$ and $X_2$ wish to generate another independent key $K_2$. The four terminals are allowed to communicate over a public channel, and an eavesdropper is assumed
to have access to the public discussion without ambiguity. The four models differentiate from each other due to secrecy constraints. Models 1a and 1b address symmetric key generation, in which secrecy requirements for two keys are the same. Model 1a (with trusted helper) requires that the two keys are concealed from the eavesdropper, and model 1b (with untrusted helper) further requires that the two keys are concealed from terminal $X_3$ in addition to the eavesdropper. Models 2a and 2b (with trusted and untrusted helper) assume the same secrecy requirements for the two keys as models 1a and 1b, respectively, except that the key $K_2$ is further required to be concealed from terminal $X_1$ for both models. Thus, models 2a and 2b address asymmetric key generation.

For all the above four models, we establish the cut-set bound to be the key capacity region by showing that the cut-set bound is indeed achievable. Furthermore, we construct a unified achievable strategy to achieve the corner points of cut-set bound structures corresponding to all source distributions. The schemes to achieve different structures vary only in the rate at which each terminal reveals information to public. Thus, the achievability proof is significantly simplified. More specifically, the achievable strategy is based on random binning and joint decoding. Given such a unified strategy, we derive the Slepian-Wolf conditions that guarantee correct key agreement and further derive sufficient conditions that guarantee secrecy. Then for each individual case, it is sufficient to verify the public transmission rates of terminals satisfy the derived Slepian-Wolf conditions and secrecy conditions, which can be performed easily.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces system models. Section 3 provides our main results on the key capacity region for four models and describes the intuitive understanding of these regions. Section 4 concludes this paper with comments. Appendix sections provide detailed technical proofs for our main results.

2 System Models

Consider system models (see Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4) with four distinct terminals $X_0, X_1, X_2$ and $X_3$, each of which observes one of the four components of a discrete memoryless vector source generated based on a joint distribution $P_{X_0,X_1,X_2,X_3}$. Here, for simplicity, we also use $X_0, X_1, X_2$ and $X_3$ to denote the finite alphabets, respectively. More specifically, terminal $X_0$ observes $n$ independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of $X_0$, denoted by $X_0^n$, and terminals $X_1, X_2$ and $X_3$ observe $X_1^n, X_2^n$ and $X_3^n$, respectively.

The four terminals can communicate interactively via a public channel with no rate constraints. The public channel is noiseless in the sense that all four terminals and an eavesdropper can access the public discussion without ambiguity. We assume that the eavesdropper does not observe any further information such as source sequences. Without loss of generality, we assume that the four terminals take turns to transmit for $r$ rounds over $4r$ consecutive slots. We use $4r$ random variables $F_1, \ldots, F_{4r}$ to denote these transmissions, where $F_t$ denotes the transmission in time slot $t$ for $1 \leq t \leq 4r$. The transmission $F_t$ is a deterministic function of its own observation $X^n_{t \text{ mod } 4}$ and all previous transmissions $F_{[1,t-1]} = (F_1, \ldots, F_{t-1})$. We
In this paper, we study four models, and in all models the mobile terminal $X_1$ and $X_2$ wish to agree on a key $K_1$ and $K_2$, respectively, with the base station $X_0$, under the help of terminal $X_3$. The models differentiate from each other due to secrecy requirements. Models 1a and 1b address symmetric key generation, in which secrecy requirements for two keys are the same. Model 1a (with trusted helper) requires that the two keys are concealed from the eavesdropper, and model 1b (with untrusted helper) further requires that the two keys are concealed from terminal $X_3$ in addition to the eavesdropper. Models 2a and 2b (with trusted and untrusted helper) assume the same secrecy requirements for the two keys as models 1a and 1b, respectively, except that the key $K_2$ is further required to be concealed from terminal $X_1$ for both models. Thus, models 2a and 2b address asymmetric key generation.

We next introduce the mathematical conditions that a key pair $(K_1, K_2)$ should satisfy. A random variable $U$ is said to be $\epsilon$-recoverable from another random variable $V$, if there exists
For all models studied in this paper, the key $K_1$ is required to be $\epsilon$-recoverable at terminals $\mathcal{X}_0$ and $\mathcal{X}_1$ with the public transmission $F$, i.e., it can be $\epsilon$-recoverable from $(X_0^n, F)$ and $(X_1^n, F)$, respectively, and the key $K_2$ is required to be $\epsilon$-recoverable at terminals $\mathcal{X}_0$ and $\mathcal{X}_2$ with public transmission $F$, i.e., it can be $\epsilon$-recoverable from $(X_0^n, F)$ and $(X_2^n, F)$, respectively. Furthermore, $K_1$ and $K_2$ should satisfy the uniformity conditions:

$$\frac{1}{n} H(K_1) \geq \frac{1}{n} \log |K_1| - \epsilon,$$  

and

$$\frac{1}{n} H(K_2) \geq \frac{1}{n} \log |K_2| - \epsilon,$$

where $K_1$ and $K_2$ denote the alphabets of the random variables $K_1$ and $K_2$, respectively.

For symmetric key generation with trusted helper (model 1a) and with untrusted helper (model 1b), $K_1$ and $K_2$ are required to respectively satisfy the secrecy conditions:

$$\frac{1}{n} I(K_1; K_2; F) < \epsilon,$$

and

$$\frac{1}{n} I(K_1; K_2; F^n) < \epsilon.$$

For asymmetric key generation with trusted helper (model 2a) and with untrusted helper (model 2b), $K_1$ and $K_2$ are required to respectively satisfy the secrecy conditions:

$$\frac{1}{n} I(K_1; F) < \epsilon,$$

and

$$\frac{1}{n} I(K_1; F; X_1^n) < \epsilon.$$

In (2)-(7), $\epsilon$ can be arbitrarily small as the sequence length $n$ gets sufficiently large.

**Definition 1.** For each of the above models, a rate pair $(R_1, R_2)$ is said to be achievable if for every $\epsilon > 0$, $\delta > 0$, and for sufficiently large $n$, a key pair $(K_1, K_2)$ can be generated to satisfy

$$\frac{1}{n} H(K_1) > R_1 - \delta,$$

and satisfy (4), (2), and (3) for symmetric key generation with trusted helper, satisfy (5), (2), and (3) for symmetric key generation with untrusted helper, satisfy (6), (2), (3) for asymmetric key generation with trusted helper, and satisfy (7), (2), (3) for asymmetric key generation with untrusted helper.

Our goal is to characterize the key capacity region that contains all achievable rate pairs $(R_1, R_2)$ for all models.

3Here these conditions are all weak secrecy (for strong secrecy, there is no $1/n$ factor on the left hand side), and can be strengthened to strong secrecy without loss of performance by applying the idea in [13].
3 Main Results

In this section, we provide characterization of the key capacity region for the four models described in Section 2. We also provide intuitive understanding of these regions and key generation schemes for achieving these regions with the detailed technical proofs relegated to appendices.

3.1 Symmetric Key Generation with Trusted Helper

In this subsection, we study the problem of symmetric key generation with trusted helper, in which the generated two keys are required to be secure only from the eavesdropper. For concise presentation, we introduce the following notations:

\[ R_A := \min \{ I(X_1X_3; X_0X_2), I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3) \} \]  
\[ R_B := \min \{ I(X_0X_1; X_2X_3), I(X_2; X_0X_1X_3) \} \]  
\[ R_C := \min \{ I(X_0; X_1X_2X_3), I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2) \} \]

The following theorem characterize the key capacity region of this model.

**Theorem 1.** The key capacity region for symmetric key generation with trusted helper contains rate pairs \((R_1, R_2)\) satisfying the following inequalities:

\[ R_1 \leq R_A; \]  
\[ R_2 \leq R_B; \]  
\[ R_1 + R_2 \leq R_C. \]

**Proof.** See Appendix A. \(\square\)

Since the secrecy constraints on \(K_1\) and \(K_2\) are symmetric, the bounds on \(R_1\) and \(R_2\) are also symmetric. These bounds can be intuitively understood as cut-set bounds. In particular, the upper bound on \(R_1\) in (10) is due to the two cuts separating \(X_0\) and \(X_1\) for generating \(K_1\) (the other two cuts separating \(X_0\) and \(X_1\) are in the sum rate bound (12)). The upper bound on \(R_2\) in (11) is due to the two cuts separating \(X_0\) and \(X_2\) for generating \(K_2\). The sum rate bound (12) is due to the two cuts separating \(X_0\) and \((X_1, X_2)\) for generating two keys \(K_1\) and \(K_2\) simultaneously.

The structure of the key capacity region is illustrated in Fig. 5. We next describe the idea of constructing an achievable scheme to achieve the key capacity region. It suffices to show the achievability of the points P and Q. Since the secrecy constraints on \(K_1\) and \(K_2\) are symmetric, it is sufficient to show that the corner point P is achievable, and then the achievability of the point Q follows by symmetry. We assume that \(R_A < R_C\), because otherwise the point P would collapse to the point A, which is shown to be achievable by previous work [5]. The key rate pair of the point P is given by \(R_1 = R_A\) and \(R_2 = R_C - R_A\).
Corresponding to different source distributions, each of $R_A$ and $R_C$ can take one of the two mutual information terms given in (9a) and (9c), respectively. Hence, the coordinates of the point P can take four forms, i.e., case 1 with $R_A = I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3)$ and $R_C = I(X_0; X_1X_2X_3)$, case 2 with $R_A = I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3)$ and $R_C = I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2)$, case 3 with $R_A = I(X_1X_3; X_0X_2)$ and $R_C = I(X_0; X_1X_2X_3)$, and case 4 with $R_A = I(X_1X_3; X_0X_2)$ and $R_C = I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2)$.

We construct a unified scheme to achieve the rate point P for all cases. More specifically, terminals $X_1$, $X_2$, and $X_3$ reveal information to public in order to guarantee that terminal $X_0$ recovers $X_1^n$, $X_2^n$ and $X_3^n$. Then, $K_1$ is generated by terminals $X_0$ and $X_1$ based on $X_1^n$, and $K_2$ is generated by terminals $X_0$ and $X_2$ based on $X_2^n$. The schemes for the four cases are different only in the rate at which each terminal reveals information to public. We let $\tilde{R}_1, \tilde{R}_2$ and $\tilde{R}_3$ denote the rates at which terminals $X_1, X_2$ and $X_3$ reveal information to public, respectively. In the following, we explain the idea of the achievable scheme for each case.

**Case 1.** The key rate pair of the point P is given by $(I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3), H(X_2X_3|X_1) - H(X_2X_3|X_0))$. Since the rate of $K_1$ needs to be maximized, terminal $X_1$ should reveal as little information as possible. Hence, terminals $X_2$ and $X_3$ first reveal information at the rate $\tilde{R}_2 + \tilde{R}_3 = H(X_2X_3|X_0)$ so that terminal $X_1$ needs to release only at the rate $\tilde{R}_1 = H(X_1|X_0X_2X_3)$ in order for $X_0$ to recover $X_1^n$. Thus, the rate of $K_1$ can be as large as $I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3)$. Since generation of $K_1$ already uses up information contained in $X_1^n$, $K_2$ can be generated only based on information contained in $X_2^n$ and $X_3^n$ given $X_1^n$. Thus, $R_2$ can be as large as $H(X_2X_3|X_1) - H(X_2X_3|X_0)$, where the subtraction is due to public discussion at the rate $\hat{R}_2 + \hat{R}_3 = H(X_2X_3|X_0)$.

**Case 2.** The key rate pair of the point P is given by $(I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3), H(X_2|X_1) - H(X_2|X_0X_3))$. The argument for $R_1$ is the same as that for case 1. In case 2, $R_C = I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2)$, which implies that $I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2) \leq I(X_0; X_1X_2X_3)$. This further implies
Thus, in order for terminal $\mathcal{X}_0$ to recover $X^n_2$ and $X^n_3$, it is more efficient to let $\mathcal{X}_3$ reveal information first at the rate $R_3 = H(X_3|X_0)$, and then let $\mathcal{X}_2$ to reveal information at the rate $R_2 = H(X_2|X_0X_3)$. Since in this case $\mathcal{X}_2$ does not recover $X^n_3$, the key rate $R_2 = H(X_2|X_1) - H(X_2|X_0X_3)$.

**Case 3.** The key rate pair of the point $P$ is given by $(I(X_0X_2;X_1X_3), H(X_2|X_1X_3) - H(X_2|X_0))$. The case conditions $R_A = I(X_0X_2;X_1X_3)$ and $R_C = I(X_0;X_1X_2X_3)$ implies that $X_0$ and $X_2$ have high correlation and $X_1$ and $X_3$ have high correlation. Thus, a natural idea for public discussion is to let terminal $\mathcal{X}_0$ recover $X^n_2$ and let $\mathcal{X}_1$ recover $X^n_3$ first, and then generate $K_1$ between terminals $\mathcal{X}_0$ and $\mathcal{X}_1$ to achieve $R_1 = I(X_0X_2;X_1X_3)$. Since $X^n_1$ and $X^n_3$ have been fully used for generating $K_1$, then $K_2$ can achieve the rate $R_2 = H(X_2|X_1X_3) - H(X_2|X_0)$, where the subtraction is due to the public transmission of terminal $\mathcal{X}_2$ to let $\mathcal{X}_0$ recover $X^n_2$.

**Case 4.** This case does not exist because of the controversy induced by setting $R_A = I(X_0X_2;X_1X_3)$ and $R_C = I(X_0X_3;X_1X_2)$.

### 3.2 Symmetric Key Generation with Untrusted Helper

In this subsection, we study the problem of symmetric key generation with untrusted helper, in which the two generated keys are required to be secure from both the eavesdropper and the helper terminal $\mathcal{X}_3$. The following theorem characterizes the key capacity region of this model.

**Theorem 2.** The key capacity region for symmetric key generation with untrusted helper contains rate pairs $(R_1, R_2)$ satisfying the following inequalities:

\begin{align}
R_1 &< I(X_1;X_0X_2|X_3), \\
R_2 &< I(X_2;X_0X_1|X_3), \\
R_1 + R_2 &< I(X_0;X_1X_2|X_3).
\end{align}

**Proof.** See Appendix B. \(\square\)

These bounds can also be intuitively understood as cut-set bounds. In particular, the upper bound on $R_1$ in (13) is due to the cut separating $\mathcal{X}_0$ and $\mathcal{X}_1$ for generating $K_1$ (the other cut separating $\mathcal{X}_0$ and $\mathcal{X}_1$ is in sum rate bound (15)). The upper bound on $R_2$ in (14) is due to the cut separating $\mathcal{X}_0$ and $\mathcal{X}_2$ for generating $K_2$. The sum rate bound (15) is due to the cut separating $\mathcal{X}_0$ and $(\mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{X}_2)$ for generating two keys $K_1$ and $K_2$ simultaneously. All the bounds (13)-(15) are conditioned on $X_3$ because both $K_1$ and $K_2$ are required to be secure from terminal $\mathcal{X}_3$.

Comparing Theorem 2 to Theorem 1, it is clear that the key capacity region for symmetric key generation with untrusted helper is contained in the key capacity region for symmetric key generation with trusted helper, because it always holds that $I(X_1;X_0X_2|X_3) \leq R_A$, $I(X_2;X_0X_3|X_1) \leq R_2$, and $I(X_0;X_1X_2|X_3) \leq R_1$.
\[ I(X_2; X_0 X_1 | X_3) \leq R_B \quad \text{and} \quad I(X_0; X_1 X_2 | X_3) \leq R_C. \] This is reasonable due to the additional requirement for the keys to be concealed from the helper when the helper is untrusted.

The structure of the key capacity region is illustrated in Fig. 6. In order to justify the achievability of the region, by symmetry, it is sufficient to show the achievability of the point P in Fig. 6. The rate pair at point P is given by \( (I(X_1; X_0 X_2 | X_3), H(X_2 | X_1 X_3) - H(X_2 | X_0 X_3)) \). The idea to achieve the point P follows the unified strategy in previous subsection: first public discussion guarantees that terminal \( \mathcal{X}_0 \) recovers \( X_1^n, X_2^n \) and \( X_3^n \) correctly, and then \( K_1 \) is generated by terminals \( \mathcal{X}_0 \) and \( \mathcal{X}_1 \) based on \( X_1^n \) and \( K_2 \) is generated by terminals \( \mathcal{X}_0 \) and \( \mathcal{X}_2 \) based on \( X_2^n \). Since the generated keys should be concealed from the helper terminal \( \mathcal{X}_3 \), \( X_3^n \) cannot be used as random resource for generating the keys, although the helper can still participate the public discussion to assist recovery of source sequences.

More specifically, since the rate of \( K_1 \) needs to be maximized, terminal \( \mathcal{X}_1 \) should reveal as little information as possible. Hence, terminals \( \mathcal{X}_2 \) and \( \mathcal{X}_3 \) first reveal information at the rate \( \bar{R}_2 + \bar{R}_3 = H(X_2 X_3 | X_0) \) so that terminal \( \mathcal{X}_1 \) needs to release only at the rate \( \bar{R}_1 = H(X_1 | X_0 X_2 X_3) \) in order for \( \mathcal{X}_0 \) to recover \( X_1^n \). Thus, the rate of \( K_1 \) can be as large as \( I(X_1; X_0 X_2 | X_3) \). Since \( \mathcal{X}_3 \) is an untrusted helper, it can reveal information at any rate. Hence, \( \bar{R}_2 \) can be set to be \( H(X_2 | X_0 X_3) \). Consequently, \( R_2 = H(X_2 | X_1 X_3) - H(X_2 | X_0 X_3) \), because generation of \( K_1 \) already uses up information contained in \( X_1^n \), \( K_2 \) can be generated only based on information contained in \( X_2^n \) given \( X_1^n \) and \( X_3^n \).

### 3.3 Asymmetric Key Generation with Trusted Helper

In this subsection, we study the problem of asymmetric key generation with trusted helper, in which the two generated keys are required to be secure from the eavesdropper, and further-
more, the key $K_2$ is also required to be secure from terminal $X_1$. For concise presentation, we introduce the following notations:

\[ R_A := \min \{ I(X_1; X_3; X_0 X_2), I(X_1; X_0 X_2 X_3) \}; \]  
\[ R_B' := \min \{ I(X_0; X_2X_3|X_1), I(X_2; X_0X_3|X_1) \}; \]  
\[ R_C := \min \{ I(X_0; X_1X_2X_3), I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2) \}. \]  

We note that the expressions of $R_A$ and $R_C$ remain unchanged comparing to those in Section 3.1, but $R_B'$ is different from $R_B$ by having $X_1$ in the conditioning.

The following theorem characterizes the key capacity region of the model of interest.

**Theorem 3.** The key capacity region for asymmetric key generation with trusted helper contains rate pairs $(R_1, R_2)$ satisfying the following inequalities:

\[ R_1 \leq R_A; \]  
\[ R_2 \leq R_B'; \]  
\[ R_1 + R_2 \leq R_C. \]  

*Proof.* See Appendix C.

We note that if $X^n_3$ is independent of $(X^n_0, X^n_1, X^n_2)$, then the helper terminal is not able to help in key generation. In such a case, the key capacity region characterized in Theorem 3 reduces to that established in [12] for the same model without a helper.

The above bounds can be intuitively understood as cut-set bounds. In particular, the upper bound on $R_1$ in (17) is due to the two cuts separating $X_0$ and $X_1$ for generating $K_1$ (the other two cuts separating $X_0$ and $X_1$ are in the sum rate bound (19)). The sum rate bound (19) is due to the cut separating $X_0$ and $(X_1, X_2)$ for generating two keys $K_1$ and $K_2$ simultaneously. The upper bound on $R_2$ in (18) is due to the cut separating $X_0$ and $X_2$ for generating $K_2$, and the conditioning on $X_1$ is due to the requirement that $K_2$ be concealed from $X_1$.

The key capacity region is illustrated in Fig. 7. We next describe our idea of constructing an achievable scheme to achieve the key capacity region. Since the secrecy requirements for the two keys are different, we need to design achievable schemes to achieve the points P and Q separately. Corresponding to different source distributions, the rate pairs of the points P and Q can take different forms. Interestingly, the following unified strategy can achieve the points P and Q for all cases. Namely, terminals $X_1, X_2$ and $X_3$ reveal information to public such that terminal $X_0$ can recover $(X^n_1, X^n_2, X^n_3)$ correctly. Then $K_1$ is generated based on $X^n_1$, and $K_2$ is generated based on $X^n_3$. The schemes for different cases vary only in the rate at which each terminal reveals information to public. Here, we still use $\tilde{R}_1, \tilde{R}_2$ and $\tilde{R}_3$ to denote the rates at which terminals $X_1, X_2, X_3$ reveal information to public, respectively.

For the point P, it can be observed that its rate coordinates are exactly the same as those in Section 3.1, and can be shown to be achievable by the same schemes designed in Section 3.1 for symmetric key generation with trusted helper. This is because both models should reach...
the same maximum rate $R_1$ of $K_1$ due to the same secrecy requirement for $K_1$. Furthermore, since both models should exhaust all random resource in $X_1^n$ for generating $K_1$, $K_2$ should be generated from random resource independent from $X_1^n$ even if it is not required to be independent from $X_1^n$ in symmetric key generation. Thus, the two models also have the same rate $R_2$ at the point $P$.

For the point $Q$, the rate coordinates are given by $(R_C - R_B')$. Corresponding to different source distributions, each of $R_C$ and $R_B'$ can take one of the two mutual information terms given in (19) and (18), respectively. Hence, the coordinates of the point $Q$ can take four forms, i.e., case 1 with $R_C = I(X_0; X_1 X_2 X_3)$ and $R_B' = I(X_0; X_2 X_3 | X_1)$; case 2 with $R_C = I(X_0; X_1 X_2 X_3)$ and $R_B' = I(X_2; X_0 X_3 | X_1)$; case 3 with $R_C = I(X_0 X_3; X_1 X_2)$ and $R_B' = I(X_0; X_2 X_3 | X_1)$; and case 4 with $R_C = I(X_0 X_3; X_1 X_2)$ and $R_B' = I(X_2; X_0 X_3 | X_1)$. In the following we explain the idea of the achievable scheme for each case and relegate the detailed proof to Appendix C. We note that achievable designs for the following cases are different due to the source distributions that determine these cases.

**Case 1.** The key rate pair of the point $Q$ is given by $(I(X_0; X_1), I(X_0; X_2 X_3 | X_1))$. In order to generate $K_1$ at the rate $I(X_0; X_1)$, terminal $\mathcal{X}_1$ can reveal information at the rate $\tilde{R}_1 = H(X_1 | X_0)$. Then terminal $\mathcal{X}_0$ can recover $X_1^n$ correctly. In order for terminal $\mathcal{X}_0$ to further recover $(X_2^n, X_3^n)$, terminals $\mathcal{X}_2$ and $\mathcal{X}_3$ jointly release information at the sum rate $\tilde{R}_2 + \tilde{R}_3 = H(X_2 X_3 | X_0 X_1)$. Since the resource to generate $K_2$ should be contained $X_2^n X_3^n$ given $X_1^n$, the key rate $R_2$ should satisfy $R_2 = H(X_2 X_3 | X_1) - \tilde{R}_2 - \tilde{R}_3$ which yields $R_2 = I(X_0; X_2 X_3 | X_1)$.

**Case 2.** The key rate pair of the point $Q$ is given by $(I(X_0; X_1 X_3) - I(X_2; X_3 | X_1), I(X_2; X_0 X_3 | X_1))$. Terminals $\mathcal{X}_1$ and $\mathcal{X}_3$ first jointly reveal information at the sum rate $\tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_3 = H(X_1 X_3 | X_0)$. Then terminal $\mathcal{X}_0$ recovers $X_1^n$ and $X_3^n$ correctly. Terminal $\mathcal{X}_2$ needs to release information
only at the rate $\tilde{R}_2 = H(X_2|X_0X_1X_3)$ and then $X^n_2$ can be successfully recovered at $X_0$. Thus, $K_2$ can be generated at the rate $H(X_2|X_1) - H(X_2|X_0X_1X_3)$, which yields $R_2 = I(X_2; X_0X_3 | X_1)$). In order to generate $K_1$ at the rate $R_1 = I(X_0; X_1X_3) - I(X_2; X_3 | X_1)$, $\tilde{R}_1$ should be chosen to be $\tilde{R}_1 = H(X_1X_3 | X_0) - H(X_3 | X_1X_2)$, and then $\tilde{R}_3 = H(X_3 | X_1X_2)$.

**Case 3.** This case does not exist because of the controversy induced by setting $R_C = I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2)$ and $R'_B = I(X_0; X_2X_3 | X_1)$.

**Case 4.** The key rate pair of the point Q is given by $(I(X_1; X_0X_3), I(X_2; X_0X_3 | X_1))$. Still, terminals $X_1$ and $X_3$ first reveal information with sum rate $\tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_3 = H(X_1X_3 | X_0)$. Due to the case conditions, $X_3$ is more correlated with $X_0$ and hence let $X_3$ reveal its information at the rate $\tilde{R}_3 = H(X_3 | X_0)$. Then $X_1$ reveals its information at the rate $\tilde{R}_1 = H(X_1 | X_0X_3)$, and finally $X_2$ reveals its information at the rate $\tilde{R}_2 = H(X_2 | X_0X_1X_3)$ in order for $X_0$ to recover $(X^n_1, X^n_2, X^n_3)$. Thus, the key rate $R_2 = I(X_0X_3; X_2 | X_1)$, and the rate $R_1 = I(X_0X_3; X_1)$.

We note that for asymmetric key generation with trusted helper the point Q achieves the same sum rate as that for symmetric key generation with trusted helper. This is because although the rate of $K_2$ reduces in the asymmetric model due to the additional secrecy requirement for $K_2$ to be concealed from $X_1$, the randomness resource contained in $X^n_1$ can still be used for generating $K_1$ so that there is no loss in the sum rate.

### 3.4 Asymmetric Key Generation with Untrusted Helper

In this subsection, we study the problem of asymmetric key generation with untrusted helper, in which the two generated keys are required to be secure from both the eavesdropper and the helper terminal $X_3$, and furthermore, the key $K_2$ is required to be secure from terminal $X_1$. The following theorem characterize the key capacity region for this model.

**Theorem 4.** The key capacity region for asymmetric key generation with untrusted helper contains rate pairs $(R_1, R_2)$ satisfying the following inequalities:

$$
R_1 < I(X_1; X_0X_2 | X_3),
$$
$$
R_2 < I(X_2; X_0 | X_1X_3),
$$
$$
R_1 + R_2 < I(X_0; X_1X_2 | X_3).
$$

**Proof.** See Appendix B. \[\square\]

These bounds can also be intuitively understood as cut-set bounds. In particular, the upper bound on $R_1$ in (20) is due to the cut separating $X_0$ and $X_1$ for generating $K_1$ (the other cut separating $X_0$ and $X_1$ is in the sum rate bound (22)). The upper bound on $R_2$ in (21) is due to the cut separating $X_0$ and $X_2$ for generating $K_2$ and the conditioning on $X_1$ is due to the requirement that $K_2$ be concealed from $X_1$. The sum rate bound (22) is due to the cut separating $X_0$ and $(X_1, X_2)$ for generating two keys $K_1$ and $K_2$ simultaneously. All these bounds (20)-(22) are conditioned on $X_3$ because both $K_1$ and $K_2$ are required to be secure from terminal $X_3$. 

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Similarly to the symmetric case, comparing Theorem 4 to Theorem 3, it is clear that the key capacity region for asymmetric key generation with untrusted helper is contained in that for asymmetric key generation with trusted helper, because it always holds that $I(X_1; X_0X_2|X_3) \leq R_A$, $I(X_2; X_0|X_1X_3) \leq R_B$ and $I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3) \leq R_C$. This is anticipated due to the additional requirement for the keys to be concealed from the helper.

The key capacity region is illustrated in Fig. 8. If $I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3) < I(X_1; X_0X_2|X_3)$, the pentagon collapses to a quadrangle. It can be shown that the point $P$ can be achieved by the same scheme as that for achieving the point $P$ in symmetric key generation with untrusted helper in Section 3.2. We next describe the idea to achieve the point $Q$.

The rate pair of the point $Q$ is given by $(I(X_0; X_1|X_3), I(X_2; X_0|X_1X_3))$. Terminals $X_1$ and $X_3$ first reveal information at the rate $\tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_3 = H(X_1X_3|X_0)$ so that terminal $X_0$ can recover $X_1^n$ and $X_3^n$ correctly. Then terminal $X_2$ needs to release only at the rate $\tilde{R}_2 = H(X_2|X_0X_1X_3)$ in order for $X_0$ to recover $X_2^n$. Thus, the rate of $K_2$ can be as large as $I(X_2; X_0|X_1X_3)$. Since $X_3$ is an untrusted helper, it can reveal information at any rate. Hence, $\tilde{R}_1$ can be set to be $H(X_1|X_0X_3)$. Consequently, $R_1 = H(X_1|X_3) - H(X_1|X_0X_3) = I(X_0; X_1|X_3)$.

### 4 Conclusion

In this paper, we have studied the problem of generating a pair of keys for a cellular source model with a helper. We have established the full key capacity region for four models with different secrecy requirements. The models studied here consist of four terminals, which are more complicated to analyze than three-terminal models studied previously, because the cut-
set outer bound takes more possible structures due to different source distributions. Instead of designing a specific achievable scheme for each case one by one, we have developed a unified strategy for each model we study, which achieves corner points for all cases, and hence significantly reduces the complexity of the achievability proof. It will be of future interest to generalize the studies here to cellular models with more than two mobile terminals, in which each terminal wishes to generate a key with the base station terminal. In such a case, a unified strategy is desirable to facilitate feasible analysis.

Appendix

A Proof of Theorem 1

Proof of Converse. First, if we need only to generate $K_1$, the model reduces to the secret key generation problem studied in [5]. The key capacity is shown to be $\min\{R_A, R_C\}$, which provides an upper bound (10) on $R_1$. Similarly, if we dedicate to generate $K_2$, the key capacity is shown to be $\min\{R_B, R_C\}$ in [5], which provides an upper bound (11) on $R_2$. For the sum rate bound, we consider an enhanced model by replacing terminals $X_1$ and $X_2$ with a super terminal $X_s$ that observes both $X_1^n$ and $X_2^n$. The secret key rate between $X_0$ and $X_s$ is upper bounded by $R_C$ as shown in [5].

Proof of Achievability. The key capacity region is plotted in Fig. 5 as the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O, where the coordinates of the points A and B are $(\min\{R_A, R_C\}, 0)$ and $(0, \min\{R_B, R_C\})$, respectively. The corner point A is achieved by letting $X_2$ be a dedicated helper to generate $K_1$ following the omniscience scheme in [5]. Similarly, the corner point B is achieved by letting $X_1$ be a dedicated helper to generate $K_2$ as shown in [5]. We note that the point P would collapse to the point A if $R_C \leq R_A$ and the point Q would collapse to the point B if $R_C \leq R_B$. It is thus sufficient to show that the points P and Q are achievable whenever they are different from the points A and B, respectively. Then the entire pentagon can be achieved by time sharing.

We note that since the secrecy constraints on $K_1$ and $K_2$ are symmetric, it is sufficient to show that the corner point P in Fig. 5 is achievable and the achievability of the point Q follows by symmetry. We assume that $R_A < R_C$, because otherwise the point P would collapse to the point A and has been justified to be achievable.

The key rate pair of the point P is given by $R_1 = R_A$ and $R_2 = R_C - R_A$. Corresponding to different source distributions, each of $R_A$ and $R_C$ can take one of the two mutual information terms given in (9a) and (9c), respectively. We construct a unified scheme to achieve the rate point P for all cases. More specifically, terminals $X_1$, $X_2$, and $X_3$ reveal information to public in order to guarantee that terminal $X_0$ recovers $X_1^n$, $X_2^n$ and $X_3^n$. Then, $K_1$ is generated by terminals $X_0$ and $X_1$ based on $X_1^n$, and $K_2$ is generated by terminals $X_0$ and $X_2$ based on $X_2^n$. The schemes for the four cases are different only in the rate at which each terminal reveals information to public. In the following, we first describe the unified scheme, and then study
each case one by one. In general, our scheme is based on random binning and joint decoding.

**Codebook Generation:** At terminal $X_1$, randomly and independently assign a bin index $f$ to each sequence $x_1^n \in X_1^n$, where $f \in [1 : 2^{n \tilde{R}_1}]$. We use $f(x_1^n)$ to denote the bin index of the sequence $x_1^n$, and use $B_1(f)$ to denote the bin indexed by $f$. Then randomly and independently assign a sub-bin index $\phi$ to each sequence in each nonempty bin $B_1(f)$, where $\phi \in [1 : 2^{n \tilde{R}_1}]$. We further use $B_1(f, \phi)$ to denote the sub-bin indexed by $\phi$ within the bin $B_1(f)$.

At terminal $X_2$, randomly and independently assign a bin index $g$ to each sequence $x_2^n \in X_2^n$, where $g \in [1 : 2^{n \tilde{R}_2}]$. We use $g(x_2^n)$ to denote the bin index of the sequence $x_2^n$, and use $B_2(g)$ to denote the bin indexed by $g$. Then randomly and independently assign a sub-bin index $\psi$ to each sequence in each nonempty bin $B_2(g)$, where $\psi \in [1 : 2^{n \tilde{R}_2}]$. We further use $B_2(g, \psi)$ to denote the sub-bin indexed by $\psi$ within the bin $B_2(g)$.

At terminal $X_3$, randomly and independently assign a bin index $l$ to each sequence $x_3^n \in X_3^n$, where $l \in [1 : 2^{n \tilde{R}_3}]$. We use $l(x_3^n)$ to denote the bin index of the sequence $x_3^n$, and use $B_3(l)$ to denote the bin indexed by $l$.

The codebook is revealed to all parties, i.e., terminals $X_0, X_1, X_2, X_3$ and the eavesdropper.

**Encoding and Transmission:** Given a sequence $x_1^n$, terminal $X_1$ finds the index pair $(f, \phi)$ such that $x_1^n \in B_1(f, \phi)$. Then it reveals the index $f = f(x_1^n)$ over the public channel to all parties.

Given a sequence $x_2^n$, terminal $X_2$ finds the index pair $(g, \psi)$ such that $x_2^n \in B_2(g, \psi)$. Then it reveals the index $g = g(x_2^n)$ over the public channel to all parties.

Given a sequence $x_3^n$, terminal $X_3$ finds the index $l$ such that $x_3^n \in B_3(l)$. Then it reveals the index $l = l(x_3^n)$ over the public channel to all parties.

**Decoding:** The decoding scheme is based on joint typicality.

Terminal $X_0$, given $x_0^n$ and the bin indexes $f$, $g$ and $l$, claims $\hat{x}_1^n$, $\hat{x}_2^n$ and $\hat{x}_3^n$ are observations of terminals $X_1, X_2$ and $X_3$, respectively, if there exists a unique tuple of sequences $(\hat{x}_1^n, \hat{x}_2^n, \hat{x}_3^n)$ such that $\hat{x}_1^n \in B_1(f)$, $\hat{x}_2^n \in B_2(g)$, $\hat{x}_3^n \in B_3(l)$, and $(x_0^n, \hat{x}_1^n, \hat{x}_2^n, \hat{x}_3^n) \in T_{\epsilon}^{(n)}(P_{X_0X_1X_2X_3})$.

Based on Slepian-Wolf coding theorem [5, 14], the decoding error can be arbitrarily small if the rates $\tilde{R}_1, \tilde{R}_2$ and $\tilde{R}_3$ satisfy the following Slepian-Wolf conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{R}_1 &> H(X_1|X_0X_2X_3), \\
\tilde{R}_2 &> H(X_2|X_0X_1X_3), \\
\tilde{R}_3 &> H(X_3|X_0X_1), \\
\tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_2 &> H(X_1X_2|X_0X_3), \\
\tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_3 &> H(X_1X_3|X_0X_2), \\
\tilde{R}_2 + \tilde{R}_3 &> H(X_2X_3|X_0X_1), \\
\tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_2 + \tilde{R}_3 &> H(X_1X_2X_3|X_0).
\end{align*}
\]
Key Generation: Terminal $X_1$ sets $K_1 = \phi(X^n_1)$. Terminal $X_2$ sets $K_2 = \psi(X^n_2)$. Terminal $X_0$ sets $\hat{K}_1 = \phi(\hat{X}^n_1)$ and $\hat{K}_2 = \psi(\hat{X}^n_2)$. If the decoding error vanishes asymptotically (i.e., (23)-(29) are satisfied), we have

\[
\Pr\{K_1 = \hat{K}_1\} > 1 - \epsilon, \tag{30}
\]
\[
\Pr\{K_2 = \hat{K}_2\} > 1 - \epsilon. \tag{31}
\]

Secrecy: We derive the sufficient conditions for achieving the secrecy requirement (4). Then these sufficient conditions need to be verified for each of the four cases later on.

We evaluate the key leakage rates averaged over the random codebook ensemble. Let $f := f(X^n_1)$, $g := g(X^n_2)$ and $l := l(X^n_3)$. Then it is clear that $F = \{f, g, l\}$. We further let $\phi := \phi(X^n_1)$ and $\psi := \psi(X^n_2)$. Hence, $K_1 = \phi$ and $K_2 = \psi$. We first derive

\[
I(K_1K_2; F|C) = I(\phi, \psi; f, g, l|C)
\]
\[
= I(\psi; f, g, l|C) + I(\phi; f, g, l|\psi, C)
\]
\[
\leq I(\psi; g|C) + I(\psi; f|g, C) + I(\phi; f, g, l) + I(\phi; f|C) + I(\phi; g, \psi, l|f, C)
\]
\[
\leq I(\psi; g|C) + I(\psi; f, l|C) + I(\phi; f|C) + I(f, \phi; g, \psi, l|C).
\]

We next consider each of the four terms in (32). It can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if

\[
\tilde{R}_1 + R_1 < H(X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon), \tag{33}
\]
then

\[
\frac{1}{n} I(\phi; f|C) < \delta(\epsilon); \tag{34}
\]
and if

\[
\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 < H(X_2) - 2\delta(\epsilon), \tag{35}
\]
then

\[
\frac{1}{n} I(\psi; g|C) < \delta(\epsilon). \tag{36}
\]

In order to bound the second term in (32), we have the following derivation:

\[
I(g, \psi; f, l|C)
\]
\[
\leq I(X^n_2, g, \psi; f, l|C)
\]
\[
= I(X^n_2; f, l|C)
\]
\[
= I(X^n_2; X^n_1, X^n_3|C) - I(X^n_2; X^n_1, X^n_3|f, l, C)
\]
\[
= H(X^n_1, X^n_3|C) - H(X^n_1, X^n_3|X^n_2, C) - H(X^n_1, X^n_3|f, l, C) + H(X^n_1, X^n_3|X^n_2, f, l, C)
\]
\[
\leq H(X^n_1, X^n_3|C) - H(X^n_1, X^n_3|X^n_2, C) - [H(X^n_1, X^n_3|C) - n\tilde{R}_1 - n\tilde{R}_3]
\]
\[
+ H(X^n_1, X^n_3|X^n_2, f, l, C)
\]
\[
\leq n[\tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_3 - H(X_1X_3|X_2)] + H(X^n_1, X^n_3|X^n_2, f, l, C)
\]

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It can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if
\[
\tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_3 \leq H(X_1X_3|X_2) - 2\delta(\epsilon),
\] (37)
then
\[
\limsup_{n\to\infty} \frac{1}{n} H(X_1^n, X_3^n|X_2^n, f, l, C) < H(X_1X_3|X_2) - \tilde{R}_1 - \tilde{R}_3 + \delta(\epsilon). 
\] (38)
Consequently,
\[
\frac{1}{n} I(g, \psi; f, l|C) < \delta(\epsilon). 
\] (39)

Next we consider the last term in (32) as follows:
\[
I(f, \phi; g, \psi, l|C) \leq I(X_1^n; g, \psi, l|C)
\]
\[
= I(X_1^n; X_2^n; X_3^n; g, \psi, l|C) - I(X_1^n; X_2^n; X_3^n|g, \psi, l, C)
\]
\[
= I(X_1^n; X_2^n; X_3^n|C) - I(X_1^n; X_2^n; X_3^n|g, \psi, l, C)
\]
\[
= H(X_2^n; X_3^n|C) - H(X_2^n; X_3^n|X_1^n, C) - H(X_2^n; X_3^n|g, \psi, l, C) + H(X_2^n; X_3^n|X_1^n, g, \psi, l, C)
\]
\[
\leq n(\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 + \tilde{R}_3 - H(X_2X_3|X_1)) + H(X_2^n; X_3^n|X_1^n, g, \psi, l, C). 
\] (40)

It can be shown that if
\[
\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 + \tilde{R}_3 < H(X_2X_3|X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon),
\] (41)
then
\[
\limsup_{n\to\infty} \frac{1}{n} H(X_1^n, X_3^n|X_1^n, g, \psi, l, C) < H(X_2X_3|X_1) - \tilde{R}_2 - R_2 - \tilde{R}_3 + \delta(\epsilon).
\]
Consequently,
\[
\frac{1}{n} I(f, \phi; g, \psi, l|C) < \delta(\epsilon). 
\] (42)

Therefore, (33), (35), (37) and (41) are sufficient conditions that guarantee the secrecy requirement (4).

**Uniformity:** Uniformity of keys is due to properties of random binning and typicality.

We next show the achievability of the point P with rate coordinates \( R_1 = R_A \) and \( R_2 = R_C - R_A \). Corresponding to different source distributions, each of \( R_A \) and \( R_C \) can take one of the two mutual information terms given in (9a) and (9c), respectively. Hence, the coordinates of the point P can take four forms, i.e., case 1 with \( R_A = I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3) \) and \( R_C = I(X_0; X_1X_2X_3) \), case 2 with \( R_A = I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3) \) and \( R_C = I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2) \), case 3 with \( R_A = I(X_0X_2; X_1X_3) \) and \( R_C = I(X_0; X_1X_2X_3) \), and case 4 with \( R_A = I(X_0X_2; X_1X_3) \) and \( R_C = I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2) \).

For each case, it is sufficient to set the rates \( \tilde{R}_1, R_1, \tilde{R}_2, R_2 \) and \( \tilde{R}_3 \) to satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29) for guaranteeing correct key agreement and to satisfy the sufficient conditions (33), (35), (37) and (41) for guaranteeing secrecy.

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Case 1: \( R_A = I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3) \) and \( R_C = I(X_0; X_1X_2X_3) \), which imply
\[
H(X_3|X_0X_2) < H(X_3|X_1), \quad (43)
\]
\[
H(X_3|X_1X_2) < H(X_3|X_0). \quad (44)
\]
Moreover, \( R_A < R_C \) implies
\[
H(X_2X_3|X_0) < H(X_2X_3|X_1). \quad (45)
\]

The rate pair at the point P is given by \( (I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3), H(X_2X_3|X_1) - H(X_2X_3|X_0)) \). To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates in the achievable strategy as follows:
\[
\tilde{R}_1 = H(X_1|X_0X_2X_3) + \epsilon, \quad (46)
\]
\[
\tilde{R}_1 = I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon, \quad (47)
\]
\[
\tilde{R}_2 = H(X_2X_3|X_0) - \tilde{R}_3 + \epsilon, \quad (48)
\]
\[
R_2 = H(X_2X_3|X_1) - H(X_2X_3|X_0) - 4\delta(\epsilon) - 3\epsilon, \quad (49)
\]
\[
\tilde{R}_3 = \min\{H(X_3|X_2), H(X_3|X_0)\} - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon. \quad (50)
\]

It can be verified that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29) if \( \tilde{R}_3 > H(X_3|X_0X_1X_2) \). Otherwise, either the Markov chain \( X_3 - X_0 - X_1X_2 \) or the Markov chain \( X_3 - X_2 - X_0X_1 \) holds and thus the rate pair can be easily achieved without the helper’s assistance. It can also be verified that the above rates (46)-(50) satisfy the sufficient conditions (33), (35), (37) and (41) for secrecy.

Case 2: \( R_A = I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3) \) and \( R_C = I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2) \), which imply the following two inequalities:
\[
H(X_3|X_0X_2) < H(X_3|X_1), \quad (51)
\]
\[
H(X_3|X_0) < H(X_3|X_1X_2). \quad (52)
\]

Here, \( R_A < R_C \) is equivalent to
\[
H(X_2|X_0X_3) < H(X_2|X_1). \quad (53)
\]

The key rate pair at the point P in this case is given by \( (I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3), H(X_2|X_1) - H(X_2|X_0X_3)) \). To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates in the achievable strategy as follows:
\[
\tilde{R}_1 = H(X_1|X_0X_2X_3) + \epsilon, \quad (54)
\]
\[
\tilde{R}_1 = I(X_1; X_0X_2X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon, \quad (55)
\]
\[
\tilde{R}_2 = H(X_2|X_0X_3) + \epsilon, \quad (56)
\]
\[
R_2 = H(X_2|X_1) - H(X_2|X_0X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon, \quad (57)
\]
\[
\tilde{R}_3 = H(X_3|X_0) + \epsilon. \quad (58)
\]
It can be verified that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29) and the sufficient conditions (33), (35), (37) and (41) for secrecy. In particular, (37) holds due to (52) as follows:

\[
\tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_3 = H(X_1|X_0X_2X_3) + H(X_3|X_0) + 2\epsilon < H(X_1|X_2X_3) + H(X_3|X_1X_2) - 2\delta(\epsilon) < H(X_1X_3|X_2) - 2\delta(\epsilon),
\]

and (41) holds due to (52) as follows:

\[
\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 + \tilde{R}_3 = H(X_3|X_0) + H(X_2|X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - \epsilon < H(X_1|X_2X_3) + H(X_2|X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon) < H(X_2X_3|X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon).
\]

Case 3: \(R_A = I(X_0X_2;X_1X_3)\) and \(R_C = I(X_0;X_1X_2X_3)\), which imply the following two inequalities:

\[
\begin{align*}
H(X_3|X_0X_2) &> H(X_3|X_1), \quad (59) \\
H(X_3|X_0) &> H(X_3|X_1X_2), \quad (60)
\end{align*}
\]

Here, \(R_A < R_C\) is equivalent to

\[
H(X_2|X_0) < H(X_2|X_1X_3). \quad (61)
\]

The rate pair of the point \(P\) is given by \((I(X_0X_2;X_1X_3), H(X_2|X_1X_3) - H(X_2|X_0))\). To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{R}_1 &= H(X_1X_3|X_0X_2) - H(X_3|X_1) + \epsilon, \quad (62) \\
R_1 &= I(X_0X_2;X_1X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon, \quad (63) \\
\tilde{R}_2 &= H(X_2|X_0) + \epsilon, \quad (64) \\
R_2 &= H(X_2|X_1X_3) - H(X_2|X_0) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon, \quad (65) \\
\tilde{R}_3 &= H(X_3|X_1) + \epsilon. \quad (66)
\end{align*}
\]

It can be verified that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29). It is also easy to verify that the rate settings (62)-(66) satisfy the sufficient conditions (33), (35) and (41) for secrecy. Furthermore, the condition (37) is satisfied if

\[
H(X_1X_3|X_0X_2) < H(X_1X_3|X_2). \quad (67)
\]

Otherwise, we have the Markov chain \(X_1X_3 - X_2 - X_0\). To show the secrecy, we derive a new condition to replace (37) to guarantee that \(I(g, \psi; f, l|C)\) is asymptotically small as follows.

\[
I(g, \psi; f, l|C) \leq I(g, \psi; X_1^n, X_2^n|C) = I(X_2^n, X_1^n, X_3^n|C) - I(X_1^n, X_2^n, X_3^n|g, \psi, C) \\
= H(X_2^n|C) - H(X_1^n|X_2^n, X_3^n, C) - H(X_2^n|g, \psi, C) + H(X_2^n|X_1^n, X_3^n, g, \psi, C) \\
\leq n[\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 - H(X_2|X_1X_3)] + H(X_2^n|X_1^n, X_3^n, g, \psi, C)
\]
It can be shown that if
\[ \tilde{R}_2 + R_2 \leq H(X_2|X_1X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon), \] (68)
then
\[ \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} H(X_2^n|X_1^n, X_3^n : f, l, C) < H(X_2|X_1X_3) - \tilde{R}_2 - R_2 + \delta(\epsilon). \] (69)
Thus, \( I(g, \psi; f, l|C) < \delta(\epsilon) \). It is clear that the rates given in (62)-(66) satisfy (68) and hence secrecy is guaranteed.

**Case 4:** \( R_A = I(X_0X_2; X_1X_3) \) and \( R_C = I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2) \), which imply the following two inequalities:
\[ H(X_3|X_0X_2) > H(X_3|X_1), \] (70)
\[ H(X_3|X_1X_2) > H(X_3|X_0), \] (71)
Then, we have \( H(X_3|X_1) < H(X_3|X_0X_2) \leq H(X_3|X_0) < H(X_3|X_1X_2) \), which yields contradiction. Thus, this case does not exist.

## B Proof of Theorem 2

**Proof of Converse.** First, if we need only to generate \( K_1 \), the model reduces to the private key generation problem studied in [5]. The key capacity is shown to be \( R_1 = \min \{ I(X_1; X_0X_2|X_3), I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3) \} \) which provides an outer bound (13) on \( R_1 \). Similarly, if we dedicated to generate \( K_2 \), the key capacity is shown to be \( R_2 = \min \{ I(X_2; X_0X_1|X_3), I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3) \} \), which provides an outer bound (14) on \( R_2 \). For the sum rate bound, we consider an enhanced model by replacing terminals \( X_1 \) and \( X_2 \) with a super terminal \( X_s \) which observes both \( X_1^n \) and \( X_2^n \). The rate of the private key between \( X_0 \) and \( X_s \) concealed from terminal \( X_s \) is upper bounded by \( I(X_0; X_1, X_2|X_3) \) due to the private key model in [5], which yields the sum rate bound (15).

**Proof of Achievability.** The key capacity region is the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O as illustrated in Fig. 6, where the coordinates of the points A and B are given by \( \min \{ I(X_1; X_0X_2|X_3), I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3) \} \) and \( \min \{ I(X_2; X_0X_1|X_3), I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3) \} \), respectively. The corner point A can be achieved by letting \( X_2 \) be a dedicated helper to generate \( K_1 \) following the omniscience scheme in [5]. The corner point B can be achieved by letting \( X_1 \) be a dedicated helper to generate \( K_2 \) as shown in [5]. We note that the point P would collapse to the point A if \( I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3) \leq I(X_1; X_0X_2|X_3) \) and the point Q would collapse to the point B if \( I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3) \leq I(X_2; X_0X_1|X_3) \). Thus, it is sufficient to show that the corner points P and Q are achievable whenever they are different from the points A and B, respectively.

We note that since the secrecy requirements on \( K_1 \) and \( K_2 \) are symmetric, it is sufficient to show that the corner point P is achievable, and then the achievability of the point Q follows by symmetry. Furthermore, we assume that \( I(X_1; X_0X_2|X_3) < I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3) \), which implies
\[ H(X_2|X_0X_3) < H(X_2|X_1X_3), \] (72)
Let \( \phi \). In order to bound the second term in (73), we have the following derivation:

The idea to achieve the point P also follows the unified achievable strategy as in Appendix A. The public discussion is designed to guarantee that terminal \( X_0 \) recovers \( X^n_1, X^n_2 \) and \( X^n_3 \). Then, \( K_1 \) is generated by terminal \( X_0 \) and \( X_1 \) based on \( X^n_1 \), and the \( K_2 \) is generated by terminal \( X_0 \) and \( X_2 \) based on \( X^n_2 \). The steps of codebook generation, encoding and transmission, decoding and key generation are the same as the corresponding steps in Appendix A, and are omitted here. In particular, Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29) guarantee the correct key establishment.

The secrecy requirement (5) here is different from that for symmetric key generation with trusted helper. Hence, we next develop the sufficient conditions that guarantee (5) and choose the binning rates to satisfy these sufficient conditions.

Secrecy: We evaluate the key leakage rates averaged over the random codebook ensemble. Let \( f := f(X^n_1) \), \( g := g(X^n_2) \) and \( l := l(X^n_3) \). Then it is clear that \( F = \{f, g, l\} \). We further let \( \phi := \phi(X^n_1) \) and \( \psi := \psi(X^n_2) \). Hence, \( K_1 = \phi \) and \( K_2 = \psi \). We first derive

\[
I(K_1, K_2; X^n_3, F|C) = I(\phi, \psi; f, g, l, X^n_3|C) = I(\phi; f, g, X^n_3|C) + I(\psi; f, g, X^n_3|\phi, C) \\
\leq I(\phi; f|C) + I(\phi; f, g, X^n_3|C) + I(\psi; f, g, X^n_3|\phi, C) \\
\leq I(\phi; f|C) + I(\phi; f, g, X^n_3|C) + I(\psi; g|C) + I(\psi; g; f, X^n_3|C) \\
\leq I(\phi; f|C) + I(\phi; f, g, X^n_3|C) + I(\phi; f|g X^n_3|C) + I(\psi; g|X^n_3; C) \\
+ I(\psi; g|C) + I(\psi; g, X^n_3|C) = I(\psi; g, f|X^n_3, C).
\]

(73)

We consider each of the six terms in (73). Similar to the techniques used in [10, Appendix A], it can be shown that if

\[
\hat{R}_1 + R_1 < H(X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon), \tag{74}
\]

then

\[
\frac{1}{n} I(\phi; f|C) < \delta(\epsilon); \tag{75}
\]

and if

\[
\hat{R}_2 + R_2 < H(X_2) - 2\delta(\epsilon), \tag{76}
\]

then

\[
\frac{1}{n} I(\psi; g|C) < \delta(\epsilon). \tag{77}
\]

In order to bound the second term in (73), we have the following derivation:

\[
I(\phi, f; X^n_2|C) = I(X^n_1; X^n_3|C) - I(X^n_1; X^n_3|\phi, f, C) = H(X^n_1|C) - H(X^n_1|X^n_3, C) - H(X^n_1|\phi, f, C) + H(X^n_1|\phi, f, X^n_3, C) \\
\leq n[\hat{R}_1 + R_1 - H(X_1|X_3)] + H(X^n_1|\phi, f, X^n_3, C).
\]

(73)
It can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if

$$\tilde{R}_1 + R_1 \leq H(X_1 | X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon),$$  \hspace{1cm} (78)

then

$$\limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} H(X^n_1 | \phi, f, X^n_3, C) < H(X_1 | X_3) - \tilde{R}_1 - R_1 + \delta(\epsilon).$$  \hspace{1cm} (79)

Consequently,

$$\frac{1}{n} I(\phi, f; X^n_3 | C) < \delta(\epsilon).$$  \hspace{1cm} (80)

Similarly, it can be shown that if

$$\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 \leq H(X_2 | X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon),$$  \hspace{1cm} (81)

then

$$\frac{1}{n} I(\psi, g; X^n_3 | C) < \delta(\epsilon).$$  \hspace{1cm} (82)

By noting that $I(\phi, f; g | X^n_3, C) \leq I(\psi, g; \phi, f | X^n_3, C)$, it is sufficient to bound the latter term:

$$I(\psi, g; \phi, f | X^n_3, C)$$
$$\leq I(\psi, g; X^n_1 | X^n_3, C)$$
$$= I(X^n_2; X^n_1 | X^n_3, C) - I(X^n_2; X^n_1 | g, \psi, X^n_3, C)$$
$$= H(X^n_2 | X^n_3, C) - H(X^n_2 | X^n_1, X^n_3, C) - H(X^n_2 | g, \psi, X^n_3, C) + H(X^n_2 | g, \psi, X^n_1, X^n_3, C)$$
$$\leq n[\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 - H(X_2 | X_1 X_3)] + H(X_2 | g, \psi, X^n_1, X^n_3, C).$$  \hspace{1cm} (83)

It can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if

$$\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 < H(X_2 | X_1 X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon),$$  \hspace{1cm} (84)

then

$$\limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} H(X^n_2 | g, \psi, X^n_1, X^n_3, C) < H(X_2 | X_1 X_3) - \tilde{R}_2 - R_2 + \delta(\epsilon).$$

Consequently,

$$\frac{1}{n} I(f, \phi; g, \psi | X^n_3, C) < \delta(\epsilon).$$  \hspace{1cm} (85)

Thus, (74) and (84) are sufficient conditions that guarantee the secrecy requirement (5).

The rate pair at point P is given by $(I(X_1; X_0 X_2 | X_3), H(X_2 | X_1 X_3) - H(X_2 | X_0 X_3))$. To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates as follows:

$$\tilde{R}_1 = H(X_1 | X_0 X_2 X_3) + \epsilon,$$  \hspace{1cm} (86)
$$R_1 = I(X_1; X_0 X_2 | X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon,$$  \hspace{1cm} (87)
$$\tilde{R}_2 = H(X_2 | X_0 X_3) + \epsilon,$$  \hspace{1cm} (88)
$$R_2 = H(X_2 | X_1 X_3) - H(X_2 | X_0 X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon,$$  \hspace{1cm} (89)
$$\tilde{R}_3 = H(X_3 | X_0) + \epsilon.$$  \hspace{1cm} (90)

It is easy to verify that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29), and the sufficient conditions (74) and (78) for secrecy.
C Proof of Theorem 3

Proof of Converse. First, if we need only to generate $K_1$, the model reduces to the secret key generation problem studied in [5]. The key capacity is shown to be $\min\{R_A, R_C\}$ which provides an upper bound on $R_1$ as given in (17). Next, if we dedicate to generate $K_2$, the model reduces to the private key generation problem over multiple terminals also studied in [5] as the private key model. The key capacity is shown to be $R_B'$ which serves as an upper bound (18) on $R_2$. For the sum rate bound, we consider an enhanced model, which replaces terminals $X_1$ and $X_2$ with a super terminal $X_s$ that observes both $X_1^n$ and $X_2^n$. Then, the secret key rate between $X_0$ and $X_s$ is upper bounded by $R_C$ as given in [5] for the secret key model, which yields the sum rate bound (19).

Proof of Achievability. The key capacity region is plotted in Fig. 7 as the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O, where the coordinates of the points A and B are $\left(\min\{R_A, R_C\}, 0\right)$ and $(0, R_B')$, respectively. The corner point A is achieved by letting $X_2$ be a dedicated helper to generate $K_1$ following [5]. The corner point B is achieved by letting $X_1$ be a dedicated helper to generate $K_2$ following [5]. We note that the point P may collapse to the point A if $R_C \leq R_A$, and the point Q may collapse to the point B if $R_C \leq R_B$. It is thus sufficient to show the achievability of the points P and Q whenever they are different from the points A and B, respectively. Then the entire pentagon can be achieved by time sharing.

Since the secrecy requirements for the two keys are different, we need to design achievable schemes to achieve the points P and Q separately. Corresponding to different source distributions, the rate pairs of the points P and Q can take different forms. The idea to achieve the points P and Q follows the unified achievable strategy as in Appendix A. The schemes for different cases vary only in the rate at which each terminal reveals information to public. Hence, the steps of codebook generation, encoding and transmission, decoding and key generation are the same as the corresponding steps in Appendix A, and are omitted here. In particular, Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29) guarantee the correct key establishment.

The secrecy requirement (6) here is different. Hence, we next derive sufficient conditions for achieving secrecy requirement (6). Then these sufficient conditions need to be verified for rate pairs corresponding to the points P and Q in all cases.

Secrecy: We evaluate the key leakage rates averaged over the random codebook ensemble. Let $f := f(X_1^n)$, $g := g(X_2^n)$ and $l := l(X_3^n)$. Then it is clear that $F = \{f, g, l\}$. We further let $\phi := \phi(X_1^n)$ and $\psi := \psi(X_2^n)$. Hence, $K_1 = \phi$ and $K_2 = \psi$. We first derive

$$I(K_1; F|C) = I(\phi; f, g, l|C)$$
$$= I(\phi; f|C) + I(\phi; g, l|f, C)$$
$$\leq I(\phi; f|C) + I(\phi, f; g, l|C).$$

(91)
and

\[ I(K_2; F, X_1^n | C) = I(\psi; f, g, l, X_1^n | C) \]
\[ = I(\psi; g, l, X_1^n | C) \]
\[ = I(\psi; g | C) + I(\psi; l | X_1^n | g, C) \]
\[ \leq I(\psi; g | C) + I(\psi, g; l | C) + I(\psi, g, l; X_1^n | C). \] (92)

It can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if

\[ \tilde{R}_1 + R_1 < H(X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon), \] (93)

then

\[ \frac{1}{n} I(\phi; f | C) < \delta(\epsilon); \] (94)

and if

\[ \tilde{R}_2 + R_2 < H(X_2) - 2\delta(\epsilon), \] (95)

then

\[ \frac{1}{n} I(\psi; g | C) < \delta(\epsilon). \] (96)

Furthermore,

\[ I(g, \psi; l | C) \]
\[ \leq I(g, \psi, X_2^n; l | C) \]
\[ = I(X_2^n; l, X_3^n | C) - I(X_2^n; X_3^n | l, C) \]
\[ = I(X_2^n; X_3^n | C) - I(X_2^n; X_3^n | l, C) \]
\[ = H(X_3^n | C) - H(X_3^n | X_2^n, C) - H(X_3^n | l, C) + H(X_3^n | X_2^n, l, C) \]
\[ \leq H(X_3^n | C) - H(X_3^n | X_2^n, C) - [H(X_3^n | C) - n\tilde{R}_3] + H(X_3^n | X_2^n, l, C) \]
\[ = n(\tilde{R}_3 - H(X_3 | X_2)) + H(X_3^n | X_2^n, l, C) \]

where we used the fact that \( H(X_3^n | X_2^n, C) = nH(X_3 | X_2) \) due to the assumption of discrete memoryless source.

It can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if

\[ \tilde{R}_3 \leq H(X_3 | X_2) - 2\delta(\epsilon), \] (97)

then

\[ \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} H(X_3^n | X_2^n, l, C) < H(X_3 | X_2) - \tilde{R}_3 + \delta(\epsilon). \] (98)

Consequently,

\[ \frac{1}{n} I(g, \psi; l | C) < \delta(\epsilon). \] (99)
We next consider the last term in (92):

\[
I(\psi, g, l; X_1^n | C) \\
= I(g, \psi, l; X_2^n, X_3^n; X_1^n | C) - I(X_2^n, X_3^n; X_1^n | g, \psi, l, C) \\
= I(X_2^n, X_3^n; X_1^n | C) - I(X_2^n, X_3^n; X_1^n | g, \psi, l, C) \\
\leq n(\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 + \tilde{R}_3 - H(X_2X_3|X_1)) + H(X_2^nX_3^n|X_1^n, g, \psi, l, C).
\]

Similarly, it can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if

\[
\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 + \tilde{R}_3 < H(X_2X_3|X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon),
\]

then

\[
\limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} H(X_2^nX_3^n|X_1^n, g, \psi, l, C) < H(X_2X_3|X_1) - \tilde{R}_2 - R_2 - \tilde{R}_3 + \delta(\epsilon).
\]

Consequently,

\[
\frac{1}{n} I(g, \psi, l; X_1^n | C) < \delta(\epsilon).
\]

Thus, (93), (95), (97) and (100) are sufficient conditions that guarantee the secrecy requirements in (6).

**Uniformity:** Uniformity of keys is due to properties of random binning and typicality.

For the point P, it can be observed that its rate coordinates are exactly the same as those in Section 3.1, and can be shown to be achievable by the same scheme designed in Appendix A for symmetric key generation with trusted helper.

We next consider the last term in (92):

\[
I(\psi, g, l; X_1^n | C) \\
= I(g, \psi, l; X_2^n, X_3^n; X_1^n | C) - I(X_2^n, X_3^n; X_1^n | g, \psi, l, C) \\
= I(X_2^n, X_3^n; X_1^n | C) - I(X_2^n, X_3^n; X_1^n | g, \psi, l, C) \\
\leq n(\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 + \tilde{R}_3 - H(X_2X_3|X_1)) + H(X_2^nX_3^n|X_1^n, g, \psi, l, C).
\]

The rate pair at the point Q is given by \((I(X_0; X_1), I(X_0; X_2X_3|X_1))\). To achieve this rate
pair, we set the binning rates in the achievable strategy as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{R}_1 &= H(X_1|X_0) + \epsilon, \\
R_1 &= I(X_0; X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon, \\
\tilde{R}_2 &= H(X_2|X_0X_1) - H(X_3|X_1X_2) + 2\delta(\epsilon) + 2\epsilon, \\
R_2 &= I(X_0; X_2|X_1) - 4\delta(\epsilon) - 3\epsilon, \\
\tilde{R}_3 &= H(X_3|X_1X_2) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - \epsilon.
\end{align*}
\]

It can be verified that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29) if \( \tilde{R}_3 > H(X_3|X_0X_1X_2) \). Otherwise, the rate pair can be easily achieved without the helper’s assistance. It can also be verified that the above rates (104)-(108) satisfy the secrecy conditions (93), (95), (97) and (100).

**Case 2:** \( R_C = I(X_0; X_1X_2X_3) \) and \( R_B' = I(X_2; X_0X_3|X_1) \), which imply

\[
\begin{align*}
H(X_3|X_1X_2) &< H(X_3|X_0), \\
H(X_3|X_0X_1) &< H(X_3|X_1X_2).
\end{align*}
\]

The rate pair at the point Q is given by \( (I(X_0; X_1X_3) - I(X_2; X_3|X_1), I(X_2; X_0X_3|X_1)) \). To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates in the achievable strategy as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{R}_1 &= H(X_1X_3|X_0) - H(X_3|X_1X_2) + \epsilon, \\
R_1 &= I(X_0; X_1X_3) - I(X_2; X_3|X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon, \\
\tilde{R}_2 &= H(X_2|X_0X_1X_3) + \epsilon, \\
R_2 &= I(X_2; X_0X_3|X_1) - 4\delta(\epsilon) - 3\epsilon, \\
\tilde{R}_3 &= H(X_3|X_1X_2) + \epsilon.
\end{align*}
\]

It can be verified that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29). In particular, \( \tilde{R}_1 > H(X_1|X_0X_2X_3) \) and \( \tilde{R}_1 + \tilde{R}_2 > H(X_1X_2|X_0X_3) \) hold due to (109), and \( \tilde{R}_2 + \tilde{R}_3 > H(X_2X_3|X_0X_1) \) holds due to (110).

It can also be verified that the above rates (111)-(115) satisfy the secrecy conditions (93), (95), (97) and (100). In particular, (97) holds under the following assumption

\[
H(X_2|X_0X_1X_3) < H(X_2|X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon.
\]

If the above assumption does not hold, then the Markov chain \( X_2 - X_1 - X_0X_3 \) holds, which implies \( R_2 = I(X_2; X_0X_3|X_1) = 0 \). The point Q coincides with the point B.

**Case 3:** \( R_C = I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2) \) and \( R_B' = I(X_0; X_2X_3|X_1) \), which imply

\[
\begin{align*}
H(X_3|X_0) &\leq H(X_3|X_1X_2), \\
H(X_3|X_1X_2) &\leq H(X_3|X_0X_1).
\end{align*}
\]
Then, we have $H(X_3|X_0) \leq H(X_3|X_1X_2) \leq H(X_3|X_0X_1)$, which yields contradiction. Thus, this case does not exist.

**Case 4:** $R_C = I(X_0X_3; X_1X_2)$ and $R'_B = I(X_2; X_0X_3|X_1)$, which imply

\begin{align}
H(X_3|X_0) & \leq H(X_3|X_1X_2), \\
H(X_3|X_0X_1) & < H(X_3|X_1X_2).
\end{align}

The rate pair at the point Q is given by $(I(X_1; X_0X_3), I(X_2; X_0X_3|X_1))$. To achieve this rate pair, we set the binning rates in the achievable strategy as follows:

\begin{align}
\tilde{R}_1 &= H(X_1|X_0X_3) + \epsilon, \\
R_1 &= I(X_1; X_0X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon, \\
\tilde{R}_2 &= H(X_2|X_0X_1X_3) + \epsilon, \\
R_2 &= I(X_2; X_0X_3|X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon, \\
\tilde{R}_3 &= H(X_3|X_0) + \epsilon.
\end{align}

It is easy to verify that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29) and the secrecy conditions (93), (95), (97) and (100).

## D Proof of Theorem 4

**Proof of Converse.** First, if we need only to generate $K_1$, the model reduces to the private key generation problem over multiple terminals studied in [5]. The key capacity is shown to be $\min\{I(X_1; X_0X_2|X_3), I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3)\}$, which serves as an upper bound (20) on $R_1$. Next, if we dedicate to generate $K_2$, it also reduces to the private key model studied in [5]. The key capacity is shown to be $I(X_2; X_0|X_1X_3)$, which serves an upper bound (21) on $R_2$. For the sum rate bound, we consider an enhanced model which replaces terminals $X_1$ and $X_2$ with a super terminal $X_s$ that observes both $X_1^n$ and $X_2^n$. Then, the private key rate between $X_0$ and $X_s$ is upper bounded by $I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3)$ due to the private key model in [5], which yields the sum rate bound (22).

**Proof of Achievability.** The key capacity region is illustrated in Fig. 8 as the pentagon O-A-P-Q-B-O, where the coordinates of the points A and B are $(\min\{I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3), I(X_1; X_0X_2|X_3)\}, 0)$ and $(0, I(X_0; X_2|X_1X_3))$, respectively. The corner point A is achieved by letting $X_2$ be a dedicated helper to generate $K_1$ following [5]. The corner point B is achieved by letting $X_1$ be a dedicated helper to generate $K_2$ following [5]. We note that the point P may collapse to the point A if $I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3) \leq I(X_1; X_0X_2|X_3)$, and the point Q may collapse to the point B if $I(X_0; X_1X_2|X_3) \leq I(X_2; X_0X_1X_3)$. It is thus sufficient to show the achievability of the points P and Q whenever they are different from the points A and B, respectively. Then the entire pentagon can be achieved by time sharing.

The idea to achieve the points P and Q follows the same unified achievable strategy described in Appendix A. Namely, terminals $X_1$, $X_2$ and $X_3$ reveal information to public in
order to guarantee that terminal $X_0$ recovers $X^n_1$ and $X^n_2$. Then, $K_1$ is generated by terminal $X_0$ and $X_1$ based on $X^n_1$, and the $K_2$ is generated by terminal $X_0$ and $X_2$ based on $X^n_2$. The steps of codebook generation, encoding and transmission, decoding and key generation are the same as those in Appendix A, and are omitted here. In particular, Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29) guarantee the correct key establishment. Since the secrecy requirements given in (7) are different, we next develop the sufficient conditions that guarantee (7) and choose the binning rates to satisfy these sufficient conditions.

Secrecy: We evaluate the key leakage rates averaged over the random codebook ensemble. Let $f := f(X^n_0)$, $g := g(X^n_2)$ and $l := l(X^n_3)$. Then it is clear that $F = \{f, g, l\}$. We further let $\phi := \phi(X^n_1)$ and $\psi := \psi(X^n_2)$. Hence, $K_1 = \phi$ and $K_2 = \psi$. We first derive

$$I(K_1; X^n_3, F|C) = I(\phi; f, g, l, X^n_3|C) = I(\phi; f|C) + I(\phi; g, X^n_3|f, C) \leq I(\phi; f|C) + I(\phi; g, X^n_3|C) \leq I(\phi; f|C) + I(\phi; f, X^n_3|C) + I(\phi; f, g|X^n_3, C),$$

(126)

and

$$I(K_2; X^n_1, X^n_3, F|C) = I(\psi; f, g, l, X^n_1, X^n_3|C) = I(\psi; g, X^n_1, X^n_3|C) \leq I(\psi; g|C) + I(\psi; g, X^n_1, X^n_3|C).$$

(127)

We next bound each of the five terms in (126) and (127). It can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if

$$\tilde{R}_1 + R_1 < H(X_1) - 2\delta(\epsilon),$$

(128)

then

$$\frac{1}{n}I(\phi; f|C) < \delta(\epsilon);$$

(129)

and if

$$\tilde{R}_2 + R_2 < H(X_2) - 2\delta(\epsilon),$$

(130)

then

$$\frac{1}{n}I(\psi; g|C) < \delta(\epsilon).$$

(131)

To bound the second term in (126), we have

$$I(\phi, f; X^n_3|C) = I(X^n_1; X^n_3|C) - I(X^n_1; X^n_3|\phi, f, C) = H(X^n_1|C) - H(X^n_1|X^n_3, C) - H(X^n_1|\phi, f, C) + H(X^n_1|\phi, f, X^n_3, C) \leq n[\tilde{R}_1 + R_1 - H(X_1|X_3)] + H(X^n_1|\phi, f, X^n_3, C).$$

It can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if

$$\tilde{R}_1 + R_1 \leq H(X_1|X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon),$$

(132)
then
\[
\limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} H(X'_1|\phi, X'_3, C) < H(X_1|X_3) - R_1 + \delta(\epsilon),
\]
(133)
and consequently,
\[
\frac{1}{n} I(\phi, f; X'_3|C) < \delta(\epsilon).
\]
(134)

We observe that \( I(\phi, f; g|X'_3, C) \leq I(X'_1 X'_3; \psi, g|C) \) by simple calculation. Thus, it is sufficient to only bound the last term in (127):
\[
I(\psi, g; X'_n, X'_3|C)
= I(X'_2; X'_1, X'_3|C) - I(X'_2; X'_1, X'_3|\psi, g, C)
= H(X'_2|C) - H(X'_2; X'_1, X'_3, C) - H(X'_2|\psi, g, C)
+ H(X'_2; g, X'_1, X'_3, C) + H(X'_2|\psi, g, X'_1, X'_3, C)
\leq n[\bar{R}_2 + R_2 - H(X_2|X_1 X_3)] + H(X'_2|\psi, g, X'_1, X'_3, C).
\]
(135)

Similarly, it can be shown as in [10, Appendix A] that if
\[
\bar{R}_2 + R_2 \leq H(X_2|X_1 X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon),
\]
(136)
then
\[
\limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} H(X'_2|g, X'_1, X'_3, C) < H(X_2|X_1 X_3) - \bar{R}_2 + \delta(\epsilon),
\]
(137)
and consequently,
\[
\frac{1}{n} I(\psi, g; X'_1, X'_3|C) \leq \delta(\epsilon).
\]
(138)

Hence, (132) and (136) are the sufficient conditions that guarantee the secrecy requirements given in (7).

We next show the achievability of the points P and Q. It can be shown that the binning rates chosen to achieve the point P in Section 3.2 for symmetric key generation with untrusted helper is applicable here to achieve the point P. To achieve the point Q, whose coordinates are given by \( (I(X_0; X_1|X_3), I(X_0; X_2|X_1 X_3)) \), we set the binning rates in the achievable strategy as follows:
\[
\bar{R}_1 = H(X_1|X_0 X_3) + \epsilon,
\]
(139)
\[
R_1 = I(X_0; X_1|X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon,
\]
(140)
\[
\bar{R}_2 = H(X_2|X_0 X_1 X_3) + \epsilon,
\]
(141)
\[
R_2 = I(X_0; X_2|X_1 X_3) - 2\delta(\epsilon) - 2\epsilon,
\]
(142)
\[
\bar{R}_3 = H(X_3|X_0) + \epsilon.
\]
(143)

It can be verified that the above rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (23)-(29) and the secrecy conditions (132) and (136).
References


